A Defense of the Need for Biden to Withdraw From Afghanistan

Joe Biden may have bungled the final exit from Afghanistan, but he had the courage to end a 20-year-empire war. (Prachatai)

“What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?”  The next decade will produce many studies to respond to that question, but here is a preliminary set of answers from a long-term Afghanistan watcher, with a comment on each from another one, to form, as it says in the title of this column, “A Defense of the Biden Withdrawal.”

On Sept. 2, 2012, Joseph J. Collins, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and long-time defense policy analyst and consultant (Joseph J. Collins is a retired Army colonel and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations (2001-2004)), published the above-referenced article at Defense One.  It happens that the article was circulated to a generally left-group for analysis and response, which is where I saw it.  Here are the summaries of the series of observations/recommendations made by Assistant Sec. Collins, and responses to them by myself. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1.     Sec. Collins: "Each of the U.S. presidents made serious errors. For the first 16 years of its commitment, despite tremendous spending and effort, the United States and its coalition partners were ‘muddling through’ in Afghanistan. President George W. Bush took his eye off the war in Afghanistan and focused on Iraq. He expanded the mission from counter-terrorism to nation-building but failed to address adequately the growth of the Taliban power. President Barack Obama surged U.S. forces to over 100,000 but, against military advice, reduced it over five years from over 100,000 to 8,400 troops, even as the Taliban gained strength. "

SJ comment: Easy to say.  Most important point, not mentioned: no clear, achievable, goals were ever set forth for the US/NATO.  Why?  Given the nature of Afghanistan, starting with it being a multi-national country with 40 languages, there were none to be found, at least for "the West."

2.     Sec. Collins: "President Donald J. Trump increased forces briefly, but then pushed aside our allies, negotiated directly with the enemy, and agreed, without a ceasefire or significant Taliban concessions, to withdraw all U.S. forces by May 2021. His successor, President Joseph R. Biden, against Defense and State Department advice, doubled down on the Trump policy, further alienating Kabul and our coalition partners. Miscalculations and missteps ultimately found U.S. and coalition forces conducting an evacuation from a Kabul airport whose outside gates were controlled by the Taliban."

SJ comment:  Either advertently or inadvertently the Trumpies set a trap for President Biden, and even though the President knew it was a trap, he had no choice but to walk into it and come out the best he could, for both the U.S. and the Afghanis.  Which in my view, he did.  Could anyone have done any better?  Well surely not the Trumpies, and perhaps Sec. Collins could share with us the plan he would have followed for producing a better result.  (In this essay of his, he does not.)

3.     Sec. Collins: "President Joseph R. Biden, against Defense and State Department advice, doubled down on the Trump policy, further alienating Kabul and our coalition partners. Miscalculations and missteps ultimately found U.S. and coalition forces conducting an evacuation from a Kabul airport whose outside gates were controlled by the Taliban."

SJ Comment:  A) There is disagreement about what the sets of advice were coming from the various sectors of State and Defense.  B) Exactly how should this have been done better, Sec. Collins?

4.     Sec. Collins tells us that summer is the “fighting season,” and implies that the Pres. should have waited until it was over. 

SJ Comment.  Ah yes. the "fighting season." It was Trump had set a spring deadline for US/coalition withdrawal.  Knowing that they needed as much time as they could possibly get, the Biden folks extended the deadline by some months.  I suppose that Sec. Collins would have had them ask the Taliban to please let it be extended further until after the fighting season would be over.

5.     Sec. Collins tells us that the US/Coalition forces never should have left Bagram before the evacuation commenced, and that that the “military” was against it. 

SJ Comment.  Ah yes, "Bagram."  That will never be settled.  Apparently, there were at least some highly placed U.S. military, as well as Coalition military, who felt that because of its geographic isolation it could not be defended properly, and the main site requiring effective defending would always be Karzai.  We will likely never know the full story here (at least for some time), BUT Bagram is isolated.

6.      Sec. Collins tells us: "What were the major factors that brought about defeat and the demise of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan? First, the Afghan government was ineffective and corrupt. The more the allies pumped resources into the country, the more money flowed to corrupt entities. The coalition’s inability to control narcotics production yielded up to a billion dollars per year to the Taliban. Even the Army and police—fighting for their lives—were steeped in corruption and cronyism. Support from the center to fielded forces was never adequate. " 

SJ Comment:  Isn’t it just obvious that Pres. Biden and his team should have been able to solve these problems that had been created by 20 years of U.S. policy, “diplomacy,” and operations in the three or so months that they had to organize whatever withdrawal that they would be able to manage.  In the meantime, incredibly, for some observers including myself, over 100,000 people, including, reportedly, almost all U.S/who wanted to leave were evacuated.  (As it happened. the first domestic commercial flights departed Karzai Sept. 4.)